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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NED 0. GREGERSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs •

JAMES L. JENSEN and EDRA
JENSEN, his wife,

Case No. 16339

Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by Appellant for specific performance
of a contract to convey real property, or, in the alternative,
for damages as to the reasonable value of said property.
Respondents answered claiming there was no enforceable
agreement between the parties and that the same was barred by
the Statutes of Frauds.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court sitting without a jury.
At the completion of Plaintiff's case, the Court qranted
judgment in favor of Defendants

on Plaintiff's Complaint for

Specific Performance, no cause of action.

The Court however,

granted judgment to Plaintiff and against Defendant in the
sum of $350.00 plus interest at the rate of eight percent per
annum from September 30th, 1971, together with Court costs
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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incurred,
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an Order of this Court reversing the
judgment of the trial court and ordPring that the agreement
reached between Plaintiff and Defendants is specifically
enforceable; or that this Court reverse the trial court and
order that Plaintiff had establish,

prima facie case that

a contract existed between Plaintiff and Defendants, and
therefore that the trial court's judgment against Plaintiff,
no cause of action, was in error; or, for an Order of the
Supreme Court remanding the case to the trial court for a
new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Immediately prior to September 30th, 1971, Plaintiff/
Appellant GREGERSON, hereinafter referred to as GREGERSON,
entered into negotiations with Defendants/Respondents JENSEN,
hereinafter referred to as JENSEN, for the purchase of a
portion of the only real property owned by JENSEN in Sanpete
County, Utah.

(Transcript of court proceedings hereinafter

T) 11A:l9-30; 12:1-17; 45:25-30; 46:6-13; 47:1-10; 48:5-19.
After an initial conversation at JENSEN's business,
GREGERSON and JENSEN went to the property in question which
is unimproved real property located directly in back of JENSEN's
home in Gunnison, Utah. T 26:10-14.

The property which the

parties stood upon was enclosed by fences on all four sides.
T 37:24-30.

Thus a fence separated the subject property from
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JENSEN's home.

The property at that time was being used for

pasture for JENSEN. T 38:8-9.
In the presence of JENSEN and GREGERSON, the property
was measured by one Don Anderson and GREGERSON's father who
used a tape measure to evaluate where a building could set on
the property. T 38:24-36; T 64:26-29.

At least one iron stake

was placed on one corner of the property. T 64:30; T 65:11-23.
The corners determined by the survey coincided with the
existing fences on the property. T 38:27-30.

In measuring

the property, Don Anderson used a tax notice describing the
property and tried to evaluate what property was there according to the tax notice. T 38:17-22.
While JENSEN and GREGERSON were on the property, JENSEN
kicked the dirt where a stake could be set up to determine
the point of beginning and so as not to interfere with his
cesspool and drain fields. T 46:10-ll; T 47:4-6.
A conversation also took place while JENSEN and GREGERSON
were on the property wherein JENSEN told GREGERSON that he
would sell his property north of where he kicked the dirt.
T 48:11-15.

The parties at that time agreed to a total pur-

chase price of $700.00 for the subject property. T 12:2-9;
T 48:18-19.

On September 30th, 1971, GREGERSON delivered to

JENSEN a check in the sum of $350.00 representing one-half of
the purchase price. T 17:23-30; Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1.
On the face of the check, in the handwriting of GREGERSON, is
the following language in the lower lefthand corner:
"l/2 payment on land as agreed - other l/2
payment when deed delivered"
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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A copy of this check is attached as an exhibit.
The check for $350.00 was deposited to the joint bank
account of J. L. JENSEN and EDRA JENSEN. T 60:16-22.
JENSEN also told GREGERSON that the property had a
mortgage on it and that he would get a partial release of
mortgage from the bank as he had on a past occasion. T 12:1217; T 49:21-22.
Shortly thereafter and apparently in October of 1971,
a deed was prepared describing in detail the real property
which is the subject of this action. T 50:23-29.

A copy of

said deed is attached as an exhibit to Plaintiff GREGERSON's
Motion For a New Trial and supporting Affidavits,
tion of Record on Appeal No. 18).

(Designa-

A copy of said deed is

also attached as an exhihit to this Brief.

The knowledge

of that deed was not communicated by JENSEN to GREGERSON
or his attorney until the trial of this matter on the merits,
even though Plaintiff GREGERSON had requested by interrogatory
that information from Defendants JENSEN:
"INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Please state whether or
not any other written documents exist concerning
the property described in Interrogatory No. 2
between Plaintiff and Defendants which were written
or prepared on or about September 30th, 1971. If
the answer to this is in the affirmative, please
attach a copy of said instrument."
Defendant JENSEN answered Interrogatory No. 14 as follows:
"INTERROGATORY NO. 14:
ANSWER: In answer
to Interrogatory No. 14, there are not any documents
that exist regarding the sale of said property."
(Designation of Record on Appeal No. 8).
The failure on the part of JENSEN to properly answer this
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-4Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

interrogatory was the substance of GREGERSON's Motion For A
New Trial and based upon the finding

of the trial court that

a sufficient description did not exist which would allow the
court to compel specific performance.
by

That motion was denied

the court on the following basis:
"That the existance of an unsigned document not
prepared by the Defendant would still not make
a prima facie case for Plaintiff." (Court Order
dated January lst, 1979; Designation of Record
on Appeal No. 24).
When GREGERSON failed to receive a deed to the property,

he made inquiry of JENSEN as to the status of the matter.
T 21:4-7.

JENSEN responded that he would get the deed to

GREGERSON and get the matter completed.

T 21 :7-9; T 22:6-ll.

When JENSEN ultimately failed to deliver the deed,
GREGERSON filed the instant action.
The case was tried September 27th, 1978, before the
Honorable Don V. Tibbs, District Judge of the Sixth Judicial
District.

The court made the following Findings of Fact

which are important for review on appeal:
FINDINGS OF FACT
l. That the Plaintiff and Defendants entered into
negotiations concerning the sale of the property described
in Plaintiff's Complaint during the latter part of
September, 1971.
2.

(Omitted for purposes of brevity).

3.

(Omitted for purposes of brevity).

4. That the property examined by said parties was
completely enclosed by a fence at the time it was measured.
5. That the only parcel of property owned by Defendants in 1971 was the parcel of land located in
Gunnison, Utah, upon which the Defendants' home is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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located and the property immediately north of Defendants'
home which is the subject of this action.
6. That on September 30th, 1971, the property which
is the subject of this act 1 on was recorded in the official
records of Sanpete County in the name of J. L. Jensen and
his name only, and is presently recorded only in said
Defendant's name.
7. That no other written document evidencing a
contract between Pl a i" tiff and Defendant was produced at
trial by Plaintiff in support of his position.
8. That Defendants have been in possession of the
real property which is the subject of this action since
September 30th, 1971, ,l·id have pi! i d the taxes on the
same since that date, but have not made any improvements
on said property, save 1nd except the installation of
a chain link fence whici. replaced an existing fence on
the property, said fence being installed by Gunnison
Valley Hospital.
9.

(Omitted for purposes of brevity).

l 0.

(Omitted for purposes of brevity).

ll.

(Omitted for purposes of brevity).

From the adverse ru l in g of the trial court, Plaintiff

now Appeals.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSABLE ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT AN ENDORSED AND NEGOTIATED
CHECK DID NOT CONSTITUTE A WRITTEN CONTRACT FOR
THE PURCHASE OF REAL PROPERTY BY PLAINTIFF.
A.

THE CHECK ITSELF CONSTITUTES A MEMORANDUM WHICH

SATISFIES THE STATUTES OF FRAUDS.
Utah Code Annotated 25-5-l provides as follows:
"Estate Or Interest In Real Property. - No
estate or interest in real property, other than
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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any trust or power over or concerning real
property or in any manner relating thereto,
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered
or declared otherwise than by act or operation
of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by
his lawful agents thereunto authorized by writing."
Although the Utah Court has never directly determined
whether a check constitutes a contract or a sufficient memorandum to take an oral agreement out of the Statutes of Frauds,
other jurisdictions have addressed this issue.

In Cousbelis vs.

Alexander, 315 Mass. 729, 54 N.E. 2d 47 (1944), the Plaintiffs'
sought specific performance on a factual situation similar to
the instant case.

In Cousbelis, the Defendant was the owner

of three lots, comprising of 14,300 square feet on Galvin Road,
Watertown.

This was the only land owned by the Defendant in

Watertown.

The Defendant orally agreed to sell and the Plain-

tiff to buy, this land at thirty-two cents per square foot.
On September 1st, 1941, the Plaintiff handed the Defendant a
check for $200.00, payable to the Defendant, wholly in the
Plaintiff's handwriting, on the face of which was written,
"deposit for land in Galvin Road, Watertown price 32¢ a ft.".
The court ruled that this check was a memorandum sufficient
to satisfy the Statutes of Frauds:
It "need not be a formal document intended to
serve as a memorandum of the contract; but it
must contain the terms of the contract agreed
upon - the parties, the Locus (if an interest
in real estate is dealt with), in some circumstances the price, .... and it must be signed
by the party to be charged or by someone authorized to sign on his behalf." .... In the nature
of things there is no reason why the memorandum

-7-
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cannot be written on a check. "The form of the
memorandum is immaterial, if its contents
adequately set forth the agreement." (Citing
with approval, Hurley vs. Brown, 98 Mass. 545,
546, 96 Am Dec. 671.
The wording in the instant case "l/2 payment on land as
agreed -other l/2 paid when deed delivered" would indicate in
and of itself that the purchase price was to be the total sum
of $700.00 and that GREGERSON and JENSEN had "agreed" on the
land to be purchased. T 48:13-15.

The balance of the purchase

price was to be paid when the deed was delivered which could
not be done instantly because of an existing mortgage and the
need for an accurate description.

That description is supplied

by the Warranty Deed dated "October _ _ _ , 1971 ".

The prepara-

tion, knowledge and non-delivery of this deed should have been
taken into consideration by the lower court pursuant to the
parol evidence rule.

Mathis vs, Madsen, l Utah 2d 46, 261 P2d

952 (1953).

In Guinand vs, Walton, 22 Utah 2d 196, 450 P2d 467
(1969), the issue before this court was whether or not a letter
in which partners unilaterally promised the Plaintiff an undivided ten percent interest in the partnership violated the
Statute of Frauds since the partnership consisted of leaseholds and interest in land.

This court stated the following

concerning the interpretation of Utah Code Annotated 25-5-l,
(1953, as amended):
From careful attention to the wording of that
section it will be seen that there is no requirement either that the instrument in writing
demonstrate a valid consideration, or that it be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a complete contract in any other particular. All
that is required is that the interest be grantee!
or declared by a_writ~ubscribed by the party
~o be charged.
For the purpose of establishing
that there was such a grant by the partnership is
not essential that its assets be described with
particularity. The purpose of the statute is
that certain matters of great importance such as
the conveyance of real estate should be protected
against frauds and perjuries. As between the
contesting parties here, that requirement is
satisfied by the letter in question, and the
granting of the ten percent (10%) of the interest
in the partnership includes the grant of its assets.
(Emphasis Added).
The court in Guinand reversed the lower court and held
the letter to be binding upon the parties.
This court has also held that letters exchanged between
the owners of interest in mining claims and mining operations
were sufficient written memorandum to satisfy the provisions
of the Statutues of Frauds pertaining to contracts for interest
in lands and agreements that by their terms were not to be
performed within one year of the making.

Petersen vs. Hendricks,

524 P2d 321 (Utah 1974):
There was an exchange of letters between the
parties which tended to show that the parties
contemplated that each would have an equal interest
in the claims and the proceeds of any ore extracted
therefrom. While these letters do not precisely
set forth the terms of an agreement nor do they
describe the claims, nevertheless, it was the
opinion of the trial court that they constituted
a sufficient memorandum of the agreement to meet
the requirements of the statutes of frauds,
Section 25-5-3 and 25-5-4, Utah Code Annotated,
1953 as amended.
(Emphasis Added).
The endorsement of a check has been held to constitute a
memorandum which negates the defense of the Statutes of Frauds.
In Favor vs. Joseff, 16 Ariz. App. 420,494 P2d 370 (Ariz. 1972),
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for-9digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the landlord accepted a check which represented the first years
rent on the renewal of a lease, thereafter endorsed the check
in her own hand, 8eposited it and received the proceeds.

The

court held against the landlord and determined that the lease
agreement was valid and binding:
The "memoranrlum" of the agreement "in writinq and
signed by the party to be charged" (A.R.S. S~ction
44-101) need not be a single document and that
which has been "signed by the party to be charged"
may be one of several documents. In our opinion
this rule has been established by the Arizona
Supreme Court by the following cases. Bartlett Heard Land and Cattle Company vs. Harris, 28 Ariz.
497, 238 P2d 327 (1925); Carley vs. Lee, 58 Ariz.
268, 119 P2d 236 (1941 ); and LeBaron vs. Crismon,
100 Ariz. 206, 412 P2d 705 (1966).
We hold that when Mrs. Joseff endorsed the check
in her own hand, deposited the same for collection
and received the proceeds thereof, she effectively
signed a memorandum negating the defense of the
Statute of Frauds as to the 1964 - 1969 lease.
In King vs. Stanley, 197 P2d 321, (Cal. 1948), the
parties exchanged letters concerning the purchase by plaintiff
of defendant's property.

The initial letter from J. W. King

stated:
In looking through the records, I find that you
are the owner of two lots on 4th Avenue in the
9100 block in Englewood, California. If you are
interested in disposing of one I would be willing
to pay $1,500.00 cash. Please reply to lst Lt.
John W. King.
After some counteroffers, escrows were prepared and
thereafter defendant attempted to negate the transaction.
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff/purchaser, and
therein stated as follows:
An Agreement for the purchase of sale of real
property does not have to be evidenced by a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

formal contract drawn with technical exactness
in order to be binding. A memorandum of the
agreement (Sec. 1624(4), Civil Code) is sufficient,
and this may be found in one paper or in several
documents, including an exchange of letters or telegrams or both .... , or in a letter from the vendor
to the purchaser which is accepted and acted upon
by the latter.
In

~.

supra, the court relied upon the description

provided by separate document.

The lower court in the instant

case should have taken into consideration the unsigned deed
from JENSEN to GREGERSON.

~states:

The material factor to be ascertained from the
written contract are the Seller, they Buyer, the
price to be paid, the time and manner of payment,
and the property to be transferred, describing it
so it may be identified .... there is no questions
that these essential items were clearly determinable here. The Defendants were the Seller. The
Plaintiff was the person with whom she had negotiated as Buyer and the fact that he sought to
take title in the name of himself and his wife as
joint tenants as a matter of convenience would
not materially affect the agreement. As the transaction was to be cash it was immaterial to the
Seller whether the Buyer took title in his own
name, or with his wife, or with his father. The
price to be paid was clearly $4,000.00 net; terms,
cash on delivery of merchantable title. The
property itself was sufficiently described in the
parties' writings.
Utah recognized this doctrine in Miller vs. Hancock,
246 P 949 (Utah 1926):
Respondent cites cases to the effect that
separate writings may be construed together
as containing all the terms of the contract,
though only one be signed by the party to be
charged ... " The doctrine of these cases is
well-nigh elementary. It is at least supported
by the great weight of judicial opinion.
The trial court should have therefore construed the check
as a memorandum defeating JENSEN's claim as to the application
-11 -
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of the Statutes of Frauds.

The trial court could have there-

fore looked to the Warranty Deed prepared within the same time
frame to obtain the necessary descrirtion.
In Leonard vs.

l~oodruff,

23

li

cah 494, 65 P 199 ( 1901),

lett-ers were exchanged between tile •"'rties and deeds were prepared and executed but never finally delivered.
Court enforced the contract and ruled that

i , ..

The Supreme
exchange of

letters, which did not describe the property, constituted a
sufficient compliance with the Statutes of Frauds:
Do the letters which pass between the parties
in connection with the Ueed to Bothwell constitute such a memorandum of an agreement between the parties for an exchange of said real
properties as meets the requirements of the
Statutes of Frauds? We are of the opinion that
they do. The only requirement about which there
can be any question is that relating to the
description of the properties to be exchanged.
Each was properly described in the respective
deeds executed by each of the parties with a
view to the cor;'Lnnmation of the exchange. The
fact that these deeds were never finally deTTVered,
and did not affect as conveyances, and that one of
them was not executed until after the terms of
the exchan e offered b the res ondent had been
accepted the dates of which offer, acceptance,
and the acquiescence of the respondent are shown
by Exhibits D, F, and G), did not destroy their
effect as written memorandums signed by the parties
to be charged, or as evidence of the agreement to
make the exchange. Jenkins vs. Harrison, 66 Ala.
346, 355 and cases cited; Thayer vs. Luce, 22 Ohio
St. 62, 74-76; Bowles vs. Woodson, 6 Grat. 78;
Parrill vs. McKinley, 9 Grat. l, 58 Am Dec. 212.
Again, the answer, which admits that the negotiations
therein mentioned related to the properties which
are accurately described in the complaint, and
which, as we have stated, resulted in the agreement
to make the exchange, is a sufficient designation
of the properties to meet that requirement of the
Statutes of Frauds.
(Emphasis Added),
-12-
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B.

TO RENDER THE CONTRACT UNENFORCEABLE WOULD BE

TO PERPETRATE A FRAUD ON APPELLANT.
The purpose of the Statutes of Fraud has long been recognized that its purpose is to prevent the perpetration of a fraud.
Plaintiff's principal attack on the judgment of
the trial court involves the application of the
Statutes of Frauds. His contention is that the
statutes prohibits the original contract from
being declared valid and binding on the original
signers. We approach this question by directing
attention to the principal that the statute should
be used for the purpose of preventing fraud and not
as a shield by which fraud can be perpetrated,
Jacobson vs. Cox, 202 P2d 714 (Utah 1949).
Had GREGERSON tendered to JENSEN cash instead of the
check, the Statutes of Frauds would likely have direct application.

In Hunter vs.

\~etsel,

84 N. Y, 549 (1881) the court states:

The purpose and object of the statute should
not be forgotten.
Its aim is to substitute
some act for mere words, to compel the verbal
contract to be accompanied by some fact not
likely to be mistaken, and so avoid the dangers
of treacherous memory or down right pergury.
The delivery of the check was such an act.
The giving of a check is an overt act much
easily proved, and less susceptible to misconstruction or pergury than the payment of a sum
in currency. It is objected that a draft or
check of a debtor is only conditional payment,
and not satisfaction of the debt for which it is
given, in absence of some agreement to the contrary. That, it is submitted, has nothing to do
with the application of the Statutes of Frauds.
The statute is not concerned with the legal affect
of the payment; it says nothing about the payment
being unsatisfaction, wholly or in part, of the
vendor's claim. The purpose of the Statutes of
Frauds is fully satisfied by the physical delivery of
the instrument, the overt act indicating that
there was a bargain between the parties.
C.

IN THE EVENT THE COURT DETERMINES THE CONTRACT
-1 3-
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BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO HAVE BEEN ORAL, THE DOCTRINE OF
"PART PERFORMANCE" REMOVES THIS MATTER FROM THE STATUTES
OF FRAUDS.
GREGERSON maintains that the check itself constitutes a
written contract between himself and JENSEN.

However, in the

event the Court determines the agreement to have been oral,
payment of one-half of the purchase price constitutes part performance to take the case out of the Statutes of Frauds.
It is anticipated that JENSEN will rely upon the recent
Utah case of Holmgren Brothers, Inc. vs. Ballard, 534 P2d 611
(Utah 1975).
face.

The facts in Holmgren are distinguishable on their

The check that was delivered was made payable to someone

other than the landowner and negotiation of the same was conditional,

Furthermore, no part of the money represented by

that check was ever paid to defendant and the court construed

the same to be a conditional offer.
It is submitted that the agreement reached between
GREGERSON and JENSEN in the instant case, and the subsequent
payment of one-half the purchase price, meets the standard set
forth by the Supreme Court in Holmgren:
The oral contract and its terms must be clear,
definite, mutually understood, and established
by clear, unequivocal and definite testimony, or
other evidence of the same quality. In addition,
there must be acts of part performance which in
equity are considered sufficient to take the case
out of the Statutes of Frauds: ( 1) Any improvements
made must be substantial, or valuable, or beneficial.
(2) A valuable consideration is demanded by egui!J.
(3) If there is possession, such possession must be
actual, open, definite not concurrent with the
vendor, but it must be with the consent of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-14Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

vendor. (4) Such acts as relied on must be exclusively referrable to the contract. (Emphasis Added).
In Holmgren, the court addressed itself as to the necessity of payment:
Where, as here, payment is advanced as one of
the acts of part performance, it must be delivered
to, and accepted by the vendor, in discharge of
part, or all of the purchase price,
It is undisputed that JENSEN received the sum of $350.00
and has had the full use of said money since September 30th, 1971.
Partial performance by payment was also recognized by
the Utah Supreme Court in LeGrand Johnson Corporation vs.
Peterson, 26 Utah 2d 158, 486 P2d 1040 (1971 ), which held that
plaintiff was not barred by the Statutes of Frauds were plaintiff had advanced $44,000.00 for the development of quarries
and defendant had orally agreed to convey an interest in said
mining claims to the plaintiff.
POI NT II
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSABLE ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT A SUFFICIENT DESCRIPTION DID NOT EXIST
WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE COURT TO SPECIFICALLY ENFORCE
THE CONTRACT FOR THE REASON THAT THE COURT FAILED TO
RECOGNIZE THE WARRANTY DEED PREPARED AFTER APPELLANT
GREGERSON DELIVERED ONE-HALF OF THE PURCHASE PRICE
TO RESPONDENTS JENSEN.
In this case, GREGERSON and JENSEN both acknowledged that
they went to the real property in question, that it was behind
JENSEN's house and that JENSEN "kicked the ground" as to where
the point of beginning was to be.

Furthermore, the property

··1as enclosed on all four sides by a fence, with one section of

the fence separating the subject property from JENSEN's home.
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The unsigned and undated deed accurately describes the subject
property (Affidavit of Louis B. Cardon, licensed abstractor,
In Support Of Motion For A New Trial.

Designation of Record on

Appeal No. ?1) and appears to have been done by someone with
skill and competence in land surveying.

Even without the deed,

however, the lower court could have determined the amount of
property which JENSEN agreed to sell to GREGERSON.

In Jacobson

vs. Cox, 202 P2d 714 (Utah, 1949) the court states:
"Plaintiff's next attack revolves around the
claim that the original contract is unenforceable because the property is not described with
certainty and definiteness. We overrule this
contention. People who reside in far away rural
communities cannot be charged with unreasonable
accuracy in describing unsurveyed land. The only
reasonable means by which a person can describe
property located on a public domain, and which
has never been surveyed, is by reference to natural
monuments. The original parties to the contract
could not have described the land by meets and
bounds without going to the expense of running a
survey. They apparently considered this unnecessary as all parties knew the exact location of
the property involved; had been familiar with, and
used it for many years; had described it in all
documents by reference to fences, natural monuments, size and occupancy. In spite of the misdescriptions in the record, the original owners
knew and the present litigants know the location
of the piece of property in dispute," (Emphasis
Added).
The Utah Supreme Court has recently recognized the obliga·
tion on the part of the trial court to make a determination as
to the property purchased where there is a dispute as to the
actual boundary line.

In Stauffer vs. Call, (Supreme Court of

the State of Utah, filed January 9th, 1979, Case No. 15468),
the reference in the description in the contract was to natural
-16-
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bo u11 dar i e s wII i c h cons i s ted of s tone wall s and wi r e fences .

The

lower court ruled the contract unenforceable, primarily because
of the ambiguity in description.

The Supreme Court reversed

and stated:
"The court should take testimony as to what was
said and done and then decide what was the legal
description of the land included in the agreement
to purchase. He should order a conveyance of that
land to Stauffers upon the payment of the balance
due pursuant to the written contract."
The court also in Stauffer acknowledged that the land
values in the Southern Utah area have greatly increased since
the contract was made.

Likewise, land values in Gunnison,

Sanpete County, Utah, have increased considerably in value.
Furthermore, the property in question borders the local hospital
which increases its value. T 37:29-30; T 31:1-4.

JENSEN, by

refusing to convey the real property is now in a position to
sell the property at a greatly enhanced price to other parties.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSABLE ERROR
WHEN IT FAILED TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Only at the trial of this matter on the merits did
GREGERSON and his attorney become aware that a Warranty Deed
had been prepared and was in the possession of JENSEN and his
banker.

The failure of JENSEN to properly answer the interrog·

atory propounded to him was clearly prejudicial to GREGERSON's
presentation of the case.
Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
·17-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that:
that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the Court may
open the judgment if one has been entered,
take additional testimony, amend Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law or make new
findings and conclusions, and direct the
entry of a new judgment .... "
In the early case of Klopenstine vs. Hayes, 20 Utah 45,
57 P. 712 (Utah, 1899), the court set forth the well established
rules concerning newly discovered evidence:
"It is well established that, to entitle a
defeated party to a new trial on the ground
of newly-discovered evidence, it must appear
(1) that he used reasonable diligence to discover and produce at the former trial the newlydiscovered evidence, and that his failure to do
so was not the result of his own negligence; (2)
that the newly-discovered evidence is not simply
cumulative; (3) that such evidence is not insuf·
ficient if it is simply to impeach an adverse
witness; (4) it must be material to the issues,
and so important as to satisfy the court, by
reasonable inference, that the verdict or judgment would have been different had the newlydiscovered evidence been introduced on the former
trial; (5) that the defeated party had no opportunity to make the defense, or was prevented from
doing so by unavoidable accident, or the fraud
or improper conduct of the other party, without
fault on his own."
In this case, the standards set by the Supreme Court in
Klopenstine are applicable.

It cannot be said that the dis-

covery of a deed with an accurate description of the property in
question is not a critical issue in this case and would likely
affect the result of a new trial.

Crellin vs. Thomas, 122 Utah

122, 247 P2d 644, (Utah 1952).
From the facts of this case, it is clear that the conduct
of JENSEN in failing to properly answer the interrogatory could
-1 8-
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be held to be misleading, unfair, unjust, or culpably negligent
to justify the need for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
The equities of this case are overwhelmingly in favor
of GREGERSON.
l.

This Court should reverse the judgment of the trial

court and order the specific enforcement of the contract entered
into between GREGERSON and JENSEN, using the description provided
by

the Warranty Deed discovered by GREGERSON only at the time of

trial; or
2.

This Court should reverse the trial court and

require it to take testimony concerning the reasonable value
of the land and award judgment in favor of GREGERSON and against
JENSEN for that amount.
3.

This Court should determine that Plaintiff/Appellant

GREGERSON had established a prima facie case and that the trial
court errored in granting judgment against Plaintiff/Appellant
GREGERSON, no cause of action.
4.

This Court should remand this case to the trial

court and order a new trial.
DATED this

/-/·_c.

'

/·"day of June, 1979.
Respectfully submitted,
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HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
Prudential Plaza - Suite D
110 North Main Street
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-4404
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WARRANTY
Je.rr.ea L.

, grantors

Sanpete

,Cocntyo!

Gunnison City

oC

DEED

Jen!3en and Nedra Jansen, his wi!e

, Stat.. of Utah,

WARRA..'."rS to
Nod 0. Gregerson and Dixie c. Gregerso
his wife, as joint tenants,. "With t'ull rights of survivorship, and
noc as tenants in common

hereby CONVEYS and

, granteeo

Gunnison City
Cor

Sanpete

, Co=ty of

, Stat.. of Utah

- - ~LLARS,

thesum of Ton and 00/100- - - - - -

:.he following described tract of land in

County, Stat.. of Utah, tc>-wit:

Sanpete

Beginning at a point North 89° Vest 2.52 chains and North 1° East

1.48 chains from the Southeast corner of Block 18, Plat "A" Gunnison
Clt7 Survey; thence North 89° ~est 0.48 ot a ohain, thence North

l' East 1.82 chains, thence South 84° 30 1 East 1.13 chains, thence
South 89° East 0. 60 of a cha!n, thanes South l" West 1.47 chains,
thence Nor'th 89° Wast 1.25 ci::.ains, thance South 1° West 0.26 of a
\:

(,

chain to the point of beginn!.ng.

I,'

I'

I,

Together with all the improvemants and appurtenances thereunto
belonging or in anywise

apper~aining

1\'lTh'ESS the hands of said ~~Tan tors, this

County of Se..npe te

On the
f>erson;illy appeared before me

the si!{llers
own e.

''

ot

October

• 1971

}~
day of
October
,19 71
James L. Jensen and }l"edra Jensen, his wife

the above instrument. who duly acknowlcd;ed to me that tho

1' commission expires ··-····

1

day of

·--------------

Signed in the presence of

STATE OF UTAH,

thereto.

y

executed the

_ _ _ _ Residinz in ----···-··------·····------
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING
served two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant
on Mr. Dale M. Dorius, Attorney at Law, P, 0, Box U, 29 South
Main Street, Brigham City, Uta~//Mf02, by mailing them to
him, postage prepaid, this ~day of June, 1979.
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